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Opinion Dynamics and the




A polarised society is frequently observed among ideological extremes, despite
individual and collective efforts to reach a consensual opinion. Human factors, such
as the tendency to interact with similar people and the reinforcement of such
homophilic interactions or the selective exposure and assimilation to distinct views
are some of the mechanisms why opinions might evolve into a more divergent
distribution. A complex model in which individuals are exposed to alternating
waves of propaganda which fully support different extreme views is considered
here within an opinion dynamics model. People exposed to different extreme nar-
ratives adopt and share them with their peers based on the persuasiveness of the
propaganda and are mixed with their previous opinions based on the volatility of
opinions to form a new individual view. Social networks help capture elements such
as homophily, whilst persuasiveness and memory capture bias assimilation and the
exposure to ideas inside and outside echo chambers. The social levels of homophily
and polarisation after iterations of people being exposed to extreme narratives
define distinct trajectories of society becoming more or less homophilic and
reaching extremism or consensus. There is extreme sensitivity to the parameters so
that a small perturbation to the persuasiveness or the memory of a network in
which consensus is reached could lead to the polarisation of opinions, but there is
also unpredictability of the system since even under the same starting point, a
society could follow substantially different trajectories and end with a consensual
opinion or with extreme polarising views.
Keywords: Opinion dynamics, polarisation, homophily, consensus, diffusion,
interaction network
1. Introduction
Modelling some aspects of our society is challenging at an individual and at a
collective level. Every idea, every human feeling and every interaction is so unique
that measuring and modelling human constructs such as freedom, love, traditions,
friendship, power, or fear is defying from its basis. Obtaining a generalisation or an
abstraction, such as physical laws, which apply at a social level is frequently not
feasible. Two equal drops of water will act the same under similar circumstances,
but no two individuals are so similar as to ensure they feel the same, think the same
or react the same to some circumstances. Social settings, as opposed to physical
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observed ones, often lack of measuring instruments and units, it is almost impossi-
ble to repeat experiments and so transforming our knowledge about society into
simple, absolute, and universal descriptions is often unimaginable [1]. Social models
are inevitably incomplete and inaccurate, because of scientific limitations and a lack
of data [2] and because conventional scientific approaches cannot be applied to
many of the problems faced by our society [3]. Furthermore, just a few years ago it
was impossible to use the right amount of data or to model more than just a few
aspects of the individuals, but today we are capable of simulating large human
systems [4] with more complex interactions between its members and its environ-
ment [5]; to understand the emergence of crowd behaviour in different situations
and to challenge and, in some cases, to measure, some of the theories which are
frequently applied across some scientific fields [6]. Models of collective human
behaviour have gained interest as the need for them grows, their results get more
and more applied in policy and decision-making and their implications are spread
throughout more widely.
Models of social behaviour are complex. Many features observed at a social level
are an emergent behaviour that results from interactions at a personal level and
feedbacks between society and its individuals. Social behaviours are the result of
collective individual actions. People adapt rapidly to new circumstances,
transforming society as a whole on that process, for instance, by making it normal
to maintain some physical distance with others or by wearing a facemask during the
COVID-19 pandemic, but some of these social features synchronise our behaviours
as well, by the constant feedback others provide.
Modelling society usually requires a substantial level of simplification at the
microscopic, individual level in the hope to resemble the macroscopic, social
behaviour [7]. The mathematical approach is usually to study the emergent collec-
tive patterns when thousands or millions of people -or events- are considered. For
instance, a crime might be regarded as a point on a map, a friendship could be
considered as a link in a network, or a driver could be modelled by its position and
its speed; however, these simplifications made within a social context have helped
us to understand the emergent patterns of criminal hotspots [8], the small-world
phenomena observed in many social networks [9] or the formation of traffic jams
despite efforts from drivers to avoid them [10].
Opinions and the ways they are updated is a complex social system. In general,
individuals have an opinion about a specific topic, which is somehow updated when
they are confronted with other ideas. Usually, a person gains some confidence in
their views when they are reinforced by exposure to similar ideas or challenges their
beliefs when they are exposed to different opinions. The exposure to distinct views
is a social process and therefore, updating beliefs is mostly a social process as well,
which happens perhaps during a simple conversation with others, when listening to
what others say on the news, or what they publish on social media. And, as with
other complex social systems, individuals transform their society with their opin-
ion, but society transforms individuals as well. There are feedbacks between indi-
vidual opinions and their collective perceptions and ideas.
1.1 Polarised opinions
Polarisation and the way it emerges is one of the key questions in opinion
dynamics models [11]. An increasingly polarised society is observed in attitudes
towards the COVID-19 pandemic, views in favour or against a vaccine [12], the
consumption of media outlets, opinions on social media and many more. Increased
exposure to ideas within an homogeneous community intensifies their tendency to
be credulous, whether it is to scientific evidence, unsubstantiated rumours,
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inconclusive evidence or even fake news. Polarised opinions might foster confir-
mation bias, so that people with more extreme opinions tend to become more
certain in their beliefs [13] and therefore, it contributes to the proliferation of fake
news, whereby once an idea is adopted, is rarely corrected [14].
Frequently, individuals want to persuade others -even unintentionally- to adopt
an idea and so there are active efforts to reach a consensual opinion. observing
opinion dynamics only at a global scale and ignoring individual dynamics often lead
opinions to a consensus state [15], in a similar way in which temperature differences
tend to vanish. Yet, two or more contrasting ideas might be highly popular, even
if all individual efforts try to reach a consensual opinion. Polarisation, or even
fragmentation among many opinions, might be one of the emergent states of
collective opinion dynamics, where contrasting ideas might co-exist as a steady
state in a society.
Human factors such as the frequency at which we form ties with similar people
(homophily), the tendency of having similar opinions as a result of social interac-
tions (social influence), the fact that when presented with mixed evidence, indi-
viduals might perceive it as positive feedback for their initial position (biased
assimilation), or interpreting the acceptance of an idea as reinforcement when
sharing an opinion in a social environment (social feedback) are some of the causal
mechanisms why the process in which ideas are updated might be polarising,
meaning that final opinions are more divergent than initial opinions [11, 16].
1.2 Homophilic opinions
Usually, a person interacts with others of similar age, income or other
sociodemographic, behavioural, and intrapersonal characteristics, including opin-
ions or views on a certain topic [17, 18]. If a population has polarised opinions, it
means that, at a global level, there is a high probability that when two individuals
are randomly picked, they share extreme different views. However, little is known
with respect to the actual interactions. Individuals from a highly polarised society
could almost always interact with people who share similar views if polarised
bubbles rarely interact with each other. Yet, a different opinion process within the
same polarised society is observed when people frequently interact with others who
shared opposite views. On a polarised population, opinions have high homophily if
most of the individuals interact with people with similar views, and opinions are not
homophilic if people with different views interact frequently. See Figure 1, where
opinions are represented by the intensity of the colour of a node.
Polarisation between two opinions -or fragmentation among many- is detected
when opinions are observed at a global scale, but to detect if opinions are
homophilic, more local information with respect to the interactions is needed. For
instance, in the 2016 UK referendum to remain in the European Union, 52% of the
votes were to leave (a highly polarised election), but at a more local level, the area
which voted most heavily in favour of one of the options was Gibraltar (where
nearly 96% of the votes were to remain), whereas in Watford results were evenly
distributed among leave and remain. Thus, Gibraltar had the lowest polarisation,
where there was a near consensus for one of the options, but Watford had the
highest polarisation between the leave and remain options. In Watford, however,
with their highly polarised election outcome, interactions could still happen very
frequently between people with similar views, if the opinion sharing process is
highly homophilic and there are little interactions between the two voter groups.
A slightly polarised society does not have homophilic opinions, but a polarised
society might have homophilic opinions, or not, depending on how individuals
interact and the opinion profile. The relevance of opinion homophily stems from
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the fact that in a highly polarised population, most individuals might not be aware
that so many people with different views even exist, whereas in a polarised society
with little levels of homophily, encounters between people with opposite views
happen frequently. Furthermore, a highly polarised society might be a steady state
of some opinion dynamics but given the right circumstances (parameters) that state
could be highly homophilic or a state in which most individuals interact frequently
with people with different views.
Social media and other technological changes could increase exposure to diverse
perspectives [19], but at the same time facilitate some mechanisms, such as the
creation of links or friendships in the network, filter algorithms and rank informa-
tion which may accelerate the formation of homophilic communities [16, 20]. Peo-
ple frequently aggregate in groups of interest, and those existent communities
frequently adopt narratives from different topics, reinforcing polarisation across
distinct themes, for instance, political ideology and perceptions with respect to the
COVID-19 pandemic [21, 22]. People interacting with homogeneous communities
tend to grow more extreme opinions and become more certain in their beliefs [13]
which can favour the spread of misinformation from partisan media and increase
animosity within the population [23]. For COVID-19, for example, most of the
misinformation detected involves reconfigurations, where existing (often true)
facts are adjusted to fit different narratives [24] which are then reproduced by large
homophilic groups as facts. Massive misinformation is becoming one of the main
threats to our society [14, 25, 26] which might be fostered by an increasingly
homophilic opinion dynamic process and a polarised society.
Figure 1.
Opinions (represented by the different colours of the nodes) are shared between individuals who interact (if
there is a link between the nodes). Different states in which opinions are distributed show a small polarisation
(left part, where most individuals have similar views) or high polarisation (right part, where opinions are split
in half) and might show low homophily (bottom part, where opposite opinions are frequently shared among
interacting individuals) or high homophily (top part, where opposite opinions are rarely shared among
connected nodes).
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2. Modelling opinions and its dynamics
Opinion formation has been studied from many angles and different mathemat-
ical techniques, including mean-field theory and kinetic models of opinion forma-
tion [27], or by agents on a social network. Individual opinions on a certain topic are
usually modelled as a single-valued number contained in some closed interval which
represents extreme (opposing) opinions, for example, left–right leaning voters [28],
the level of production of an employee in a plant [7] or perceptions between
security and insecurity [29]. The process of opinion updating then is modelled as
the result of interaction with other views, a process of self-thinking, some memory
loss, or external factors. Interactions between individuals are usually modelled on
some social structure, such as a network, considering some spatial proximity, or
considering some social aspects, such as the level of influence of one individual to
others [30]. A long-term, steady distribution of opinions is usually obtained, either
as an analytical solution to some differential equations or through simulations,
which reveals among others, the formation of opinion clusters, political segregation
[31], vaccine hesitancy [12], the use of certain tools [32], the spread of fear of crime
more as a result of opinion dynamics than crime itself [29] or even the diffusion of
fake news [14].
2.1 The key ingredients in opinion dynamics models
There are four ingredients in opinion dynamics models [30, 31]:
1.Individual opinions - Modelled usually as a number, say si tð Þ∈ 1, 1½  for
individual i at time t, based on the extremes of an interval, 1 and þ1, which
are identified as opposing opinions, for instance, the levels of support or
opposition for an idea, perceptions of security or insecurity, or left–right
leaning political views. Other approaches include multi-dimensional views or
discrete opinions.
2.External or individual forces - External forces such as exposure to news
sources [33], or events such as suffering a crime [29] or an accident, and
individual forces, such as memory loss may cause an individual to update their
views about certain topics.
3.Updating process as interactions with others - Exposure to different ideas is
frequently considered as the updating mechanism of opinions. Frequently,
through interactions with others, person i finds a distinct opinion, s j tð Þ, and
might update their own views according to some function based on their
opinion si tð Þ and the “new” one, as si tþ 1ð Þ ¼ f si tð Þ, s j tð Þ
 
, where usually the
function f is assumed to get opinion si closer to s j as a result of some consensus
effort. Interactions are frequently modelled on some network, where two
connected nodes (individuals) share opinions with (some) of its adjacent
nodes. The network structure and whether it is directional thus play a role in
the updating process.
4.Metrics - From the collective opinions, or “opinion profile”, S tð Þ ¼
s1 tð Þ, s2 tð Þ, … , sN tð Þð Þ, usually its mean S tð Þ and other metrics are frequently
analysed, perhaps dividing by some population groups or node attributes,
usually as a long-run behaviour of the dynamics.
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Although some analytical results are available [27, 28], the dynamics are usually
simulated on a network. The technique allows considering individual aspects, such
as assertiveness, persuasiveness, supportiveness, extremists or opinion volatility
[28, 31, 34, 35].
2.1.1 Measuring polarisation and homophily
A group might reach an agreement or consensus on some opinions if the majority
of the individuals share similar views, whereas a group might be polarised if opin-
ions are divergent, with extremism being the state in which opinions are mostly
concentrated among the two extremes. One way to measure the level of polarisation
in a population by the variance of the opinion profile, where a large variance means
a more polarised society and a small variance means consensus. Formally, the
polarisation Φ of an opinion profile S is given by






si  sð Þ
2: (1)
For opinions bounded inside the 1,þ1½  interval, very small populations could
have Φ Sð Þ values larger than 1, but for a population with more than 100 individuals,
Φ< 1:01 and so for large enough populations, it might be considered that Φ obtains
values in the 0 (if there is consensus) to 1 (if there is extremism) interval. If a
random opinion is sampled for each individual sk 0ð Þ∈ 1,þ1½ , a 95% interval of the
polarisation is Φ Sð Þ∈ 0:327, 0:338½  and therefore, the distribution of opinions S is
classified as consensus if Φ Sð Þ≈0; consensual if Φ Sð Þ< 1=3; homogeneous if Φ Sð Þ≈ 1=3,
so that the polarisation is similar to a random distribution of opinions; polarising if
Φ Sð Þ> 1=3 and as extremism if Φ Sð Þ≈ 1 (Figure 2).
The process of opinion dynamics has a high level of homophily if most of the
interactions happen between individuals of similar views and has a low level other-
wise. Formally, if Ai are the adjacent nodes of i, then the average opinion distance






∣si  s j∣, (2)
where di is the degree of i, so that Di gives the average opinion distance from a
node to its adjacent neighbours (and define D i ¼ 0 if i has no neighbours). The
opinion homophily Λ Sð Þ is defined as
Figure 2.
Classification of collective opinions according to their distribution (represented as the height of each colour bar),
from consensus (left) where Φ Sð Þ≈ 0, to extremism (right) where Φ Sð Þ≈1.
6
Theory of Complexity - Definitions, Models, and Applications







a metric suited for measuring homophily based on a continuous node attribute,
such as opinions, with high values if individuals interact with others of similar
views and has lower values (possibly negative) if interactions are more frequent
between individuals of very different views. Notice that the metric depends on the
opinion profile but also on the network topology. On a linear network, for instance,
where all nodes have two neighbours, except for the two extremes, opinions in the
1,þ1½  interval are highly polarised (or have extremism) if half of the individuals
have 1 and the other half have þ1 as opinions, and Φ Sð Þ≈ 1. Such opinion profile is
not homophilic with alternating opinions, S ¼ þ1,1,þ1,1, … ,1ð Þ, and Λ Sð Þ ¼
1, but a high level of homophily is observed when opposite opinions are located on
the two extremes of the network, so S ¼ þ1,þ1, … ,þ1,1, … ,1,1ð Þ, in which
case, only the two neighbouring individuals located at the boundary between the
opinion groups have an interaction with a person who has a distinct opinion than
their own and so Λ Sð Þ ¼ 1 2=N ≈ 1. The expected opinion distance between two
randomly selected opinions is 2=3, from which Λ Sð Þ≈ 1 means preferential
interactions between individuals of similar views; Λ Sð Þ> 1=3 means homophilic
interactions; Λ Sð Þ≈ 1=3 means random interactions; and Λ Sð Þ< 1=3 means
discouraged interactions between people of similar views.
2.2 An opinion dynamics model
Consider a diffusion process of opinions on a network, where the four key
ingredients (individual opinions, updating process due to individual or external
forces, interactions, and the corresponding metrics) are defined as follows. Initially,
N individuals have a randomly-distributed opinion si 0ð Þ∈ 1,þ1½ , which represent
two extreme views on a certain topic. As external forces in the dynamics, we
consider exposure from the individuals to some “propaganda” in favour of one of
the views. Each time step, a randomly selected group of 1% of the individuals are
exposed, in an alternative sequence, to some supporting mechanism in favour of
any of the two views. It is assumed that the views fully favour one of the two
extreme opinions, so that they are considered as v1 ¼ þ1, the first force which
favours view þ1, and then v2 ¼ 1, which supports view 1 and so on, with vk ¼
 1ð Þk. As opinion dynamics, individuals who are exposed to any of the views
(vk ¼ 1) decide whether to “trust” or to “dismiss” the views based on their current
opinion and on the persuasiveness of the views θ, where θ∈ 0, 1½  is a parameter
which captures how seductive are the views (where large values of θ mean that
views are more seductive and individuals are more inclined to trust them and
smaller values mean that views are likely to be dismissed). Due to confirmation
bias, individuals with opinion closer to þ1 are more likely to trust a vk ¼ þ1
propaganda, as it confirms their views and more likely to ignore vl ¼ 1 propa-
ganda for the same reason. To capture confirmation bias, it is assumed that person i
with opinion si trusts view vk with probability
1þ sið Þθ
2
if vk ¼ þ1, and (4)
1 sið Þθ
2
if vk ¼ 1: (5)
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With this condition, a person with opinion si ¼ 0:4 trusts view vk ¼ þ1 with
probability 0:7θ, but trust view v j ¼ 1 with probability 0:3θ, for some θ which
depends on how seductive the corresponding propaganda is, so that individuals are
more inclined to trust views which favour their own opinions. Individuals who are
seduced by any propaganda, share it with all their contacts as an active effort to
persuade them, say by sharing or posting the views on social media. Individuals who
dismiss propaganda, make a permanent decision to ignore it, do not update their
views and do not share it with their contacts. Thus, when individuals are exposed
for the first time to the views, they make a permanent choice whether to accept it
(and update their views and share it) or to ignore it (and do nothing). Therefore,
after 1% of the individuals are first exposed to propaganda, some individuals trust
and share it with their contacts and so on until no one is exposed for the first time to
that propaganda. It is assumed that the sharing mechanism (social media, say)
works faster than the creation of new propaganda, so that by the time a new view
vkþ1 is created and distributed, the dynamics of the previous (opposing) propa-
ganda vk has finished. Each wave of propaganda follows a similar diffusion process
as the SIR model used in epidemics, where a small percentage of the individuals are
initially exposed. The “infection” (the propaganda) passes through individuals, and
the distribution of the recovered individuals is observed [12, 32].
Individuals who accept some propaganda at time t update their views according
to the volatility of their opinions, μ∈ 0, 1½ , such that individuals who accepted view
vk update their opinion between t and tþ 1 according to
si tþ 1ð Þ ¼ μvk þ 1 μð Þsi tð Þ, (6)
so that if opinions are volatile (that is, individuals easily update their views, with
a large value of μ), then most of their opinion at time tþ 1 depends only on the
views of the propaganda they accepted, but with more rigid opinions (individuals
change little their past views, with small μ), then the impact of propaganda becomes
small. For example, for view vk ¼ þ1 and with volatility μ ¼ 0:5, a person with
opinion si tð Þ ¼ 0:8 updates their view to si tþ 1ð Þ ¼ 0:9 if they accept vk, whereas a
person with view s j tð Þ ¼ 0:8 updates their view to s j tþ 1ð Þ ¼ 0:1, meaning that a
person with very different views from certain propaganda is more difficult to
convince, but once convinced, the impact in their opinion is larger (Figure 3).
A crucial element in the opinion models is the way in which interactions
between individuals are structured. Society has opinion clusters -for example, a
Figure 3.
Probability of trusting any of the two types of propaganda, vk ¼ 1, represented as the two triangles on the left,
based on the individual opinions, represented as the colour of the nodes and based on how seductive are two
views, θ. Propaganda which supports the views of a person is more likely to be trusted by the person, but still, all
propaganda has a certain level of persuasiveness, θ (the maximum height of the triangles). The impact of
trusting some propaganda on individual opinions is higher if opinions are more volatile, that is, higher values of
μ and has little impact if opinions are more rigid, which is shown as a slight colour change for rigid opinions and
a drastic colour change for volatile opinions on the right.
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social media group in which information flows easily-, has opinion hubs -
influencers, for example, who reach a large population- is likely to be strongly
connected with many shortcuts between people who are not directly connected and
therefore, the network in which propaganda is shared is also a key element in the
model. Four network topologies withN ¼ 2, 000 nodes are analysed here: (1) a fully
connected network; (2) a proximity network (nodes are located randomly on a
square and pairs at a distance smaller than a certain threshold are connected); (3) a
small-world network and (4) a scale-free network.
The model has two parameters: the persuasiveness θ, which is assumed to be the
same for all propaganda, and the volatility of opinions μ, which is assumed to be the
same for all individuals. For some values of θ and μ and for some randomly assigned
initial opinions, individuals are exposed to a total of 128 waves of propaganda (64
supporting each view).
3. Results
The trajectory of a society in terms of its polarisation Φ and its homophily Λ
after each round of propaganda shows that for different network topologies,
opinion dynamics yields different states. On a fully connected network, in which
there is no relevant network structure, each round of propaganda reaches all indi-
viduals (if at least one person trusted it) and seduce some of them based only on
their current opinion (Figure 4). After some propaganda rounds, most individuals
have an opinion either close to þ1 or to 1 so that polarisation is eventually
maximum. Also, since all individuals interact with others, the homophily is reduced
when polarisation increases. However, on some other topologies, there is a different
impact of each wave of propaganda, particularly after repetition. On a proximity
network, most rounds of propaganda tend to increase the level of polarisation, but
after repetition, most of the propaganda rounds also increase the level of
homophily. Thus, after many rounds, the network has regions with similar
(extreme) views and therefore, at a local level, nodes are mostly connected to others
with similar views. On a small-world network and a scale-free network, most
rounds of propaganda increase the level of polarisation, but the presence of network
shortcuts and hubs reduce considerably the homophily so that most of the trajecto-
ries are less homophilic than its initial levels after 128 rounds of propaganda.
Figure 4.
Trajectories of social polarisation (horizontal axis) and homophily (vertical axis) simulated in four different
network topologies. Each realisation for some persuasiveness, θ and opinion volatility μ is marked with a curve.
All curves or realisations have a nearby starting point, which marks the polarisation and homophily of a
random distribution of opinions. For each topology, the four quadrants with a higher (or lower) polarisation
and a higher (or lower) homophily are coloured and the three trajectories with the highest and lowest
polarisation and the highest homophily are marked with thick curves.
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For some of the trajectories, it is observed that the first few rounds of propa-
ganda increase the polarisation and decrease the homophily. After many rounds of
propaganda, the level of homophily might increase, indicating the formation of
clusters of nodes with similar opinions, particularly on a proximity network. In
some cases, polarisation might be decreased, but only after homophily has
decreased (and not the other way around), meaning that first, the observed changes
in opinion dynamics happen at a local level and then, they might be perceived at a
global scale. Notice, however, that very few trajectories reach less polarisation than
their starting point. Thus, propaganda or similar external forces tend to increase
polarisation and frequently will produce a higher level of polarisation than the one
observed with a random distribution of opinions.
3.1 Parameter space
The observed levels of polarisation and homophily depend on the persuasiveness
of the propaganda θ, and the opinion volatility μ. On a proximity network, for
instance, with highly persuasive propaganda (θ≈ 1) and volatile opinions (μ≈ 1)
after only a few rounds of propaganda, there is a highly polarised society, with
highly homophilic interactions. However, if propaganda is not as seductive or if
individuals do not update their views easily, it takes several rounds of propaganda
to observe a polarised society (Figure 5).
For some values of θ and μ, there is extreme sensitivity to the parameters. On a
proximity network, with higher values of the persuasiveness of propaganda θ,
Figure 5.
Observed levels of polarisation (left) and homophily (middle) on a proximity network according to some values of
the persuasiveness of propaganda θ (horizontal axis) and the volatility of opinions μ (vertical axis) after 8, 32 and
128 rounds of propaganda. Higher levels of polarisation and homophily are darker, representing extreme views and
a homophilic society respectively, and lower levels of polarisation and homophily are lighter, representing consensus
and frequent exchanges between people with different views. For the same values of θ ¼ 0:85 and μ ¼ 0:35, with
the same initial (random) opinions, 250 realisations of the dynamics follow different trajectories (right), where the
levels of polarisation and homophily after 8, 32 and 128 rounds of propaganda are highlighted.
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society might be alternatively highly polarised or close to a consensus after many
rounds of propaganda with very small changes in the two parameters. Furthermore,
even with the same initial opinions and with the same values of θ and μ, society
might reach very different levels of polarisation and homophily (right part of
Figure 5). Individuals exposed to propaganda are randomly picked and according to
their opinion, they might be seduced by it and share it with their contacts, or ignore
it, thus, altering the outcome after that round of propaganda. With only a few
waves of propaganda, the outcome might be similar, but those small changes are
cumulative and so after many rounds, the outcome might be a society close to
extremism or even close to consensus, even if the starting point is the same.
The first rounds of propaganda decrease the homophily of society so that people
with some extreme view have frequent interactions with others with different
views. As the number of propaganda rounds evolves, opinion clusters are formed,
and so interactions become more and more frequent between individuals with
similar views. Thus, even if at a global scale the level of polarisation is increasing,
after many rounds of propaganda, people might be less aware of the existence and
abundance of different views. Extreme opinions might become more frequent
because of propaganda. A similar -although less pronounced- polarising and
homophilic society might be frequently observed on a scale-free and a small-world
network, although the presence of hubs and shortcuts in the network reduces the
creation of opinion clusters (Figure 6).
The fully-connected network helps to observe the dynamics of opinions without
any relevant network structure. With some level of persuasiveness θ, and opinion
volatility μ, society eventually reach polarisation. With more rounds of propaganda,
polarisation increases up to extremism, and only with no persuasiveness (θ ¼ 0) or
no volatility (μ ¼ 0) society remains without extremism. However, for different
network topologies, propaganda might have a different impact. Particularly in the
case of a proximity network (with high values of θ) and in the case of a scale-free
network (with medium values of θ) propaganda might increase homophily and in
some cases, reduce polarisation.
Figure 6.
Observed levels of polarisation (top) and homophily (bottom) according to some values of the persuasiveness of
propaganda θ (horizontal axis) and the volatility of opinions μ (vertical axis) after 128 rounds of propaganda.
Four network topologies are considered, a fully-connected, a proximity, a small-world and a scale-free network
from left to right.
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4. Conclusions
Social models are a simplification of very complex processes which happen at an
individual level but might be able to capture some collective emergent aspects. In
terms of opinion dynamics, modelling individual views as a number, simplifying
external forces such as propaganda, simulating interactions and a process of opinion
updating let us detect emergent patterns, including an increase in the global levels
of polarisation and the frequency of homophilic interactions between individuals.
The network structure plays a significant role, as the emergence of homophilic
clusters which reinforce their opinions is detected, particularly on a network where
there is a large distance between nodes, such as a proximity network.
The observed results in terms of the trajectories and the observed levels of
polarisation and homophily after many rounds of propaganda show that there
might be a high sensitivity concerning the parameters. Two simulations under the
same network structure and even the same initial opinions and parameters might
follow different trajectories and end with substantially distinct levels of homophily
and polarisation. The model initially exposes 1% of the population to some propa-
ganda and depending on who is exposed, the dynamic changes and eventually reach
very different states. For some regions in the parameter space, there is
unpredictability in the state in which society will be after propaganda.
In the simulated networks, the average degree is 7.6 for the proximity network
and 10 for the small-world and the scale-free network. The intensity of interactions,
measured as the degree of the nodes, accelerates or frictions the diffusion of propa-
ganda, and thus, accelerates of frictions polarisation and homophily as well. A less-
connected society is more prone to the creation of homophilic clusters.
4.1 What is different between a highly polarised society and one with little
polarisation
On a highly polarised society, individuals become “immune” to propaganda
which does not support their views and dismiss it easily, whereas propaganda which
supports their views is confirmation of their beliefs and takes individuals into even
more extreme and plarised views. On a polarised society, even with little levels of
homophily (meaning that individuals are likely to be exposed to both types of
propaganda), individuals are eventually too biased in favour of any of the extreme
views, which becomes too difficult to change.
On a society with little levels of polarisation, views could either have a consensus
on one of the two extremes, in which case, propaganda in favour of any of the
opinions has little impact. This case happens when one of the two views becomes
dominant at early stages, in which case, individuals also become “immune” to
propaganda (and since the first propaganda they are exposed is þ1, that view is
slightly more likely to become dominant in the long run).
However, the most frequently observed consensus is one in which barely anyone
has extreme views, propaganda in favour of the two views flows between most
individuals and they update their opinion accordingly, but not enough to reject
further waves of propaganda and keep updating their opinion.
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